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INTRODUCTION

authors/owners desire.
Scientific workflows are gaining wide-spread use in life sciences applications, a domain in which privacy concerns are
particularly acute. We now illustrate three types of privacy
using an example from this domain. Consider a personalized disease susceptibility workflow in Fig. 1. Information
such as an individual’s genetic make-up and family history of
disorders, which this workflow takes as input, is highly sensitive and should not be revealed to an unauthorized user,
placing stringent requirements on data privacy. Further, a
workflow module may compare an individual’s genetic makeup to profiles of other patients and controls. The manner in
which such historical data is aggregated and the comparison
is made, is highly sensitive, pointing to the need for module
privacy. Finally, the fact that disease susceptibility predictions are generated by “calibrating” an individual’s profile
against profiles of others may need to be hidden, requiring
that workflow structure be kept private.
As recently noted in [8], “You are better off designing in
security and privacy ... from the start, rather than trying
to add them later.”1 We apply this principle by proposing
that privacy guarantees should be integrated in the design of
the search and query engines that access provenance-aware
workflow repositories. Indeed, the alternative would be to
create multiple repositories corresponding to different levels
of access, which would lead to inconsistencies, inefficiency,
and a lack of flexibility, affecting the desired techniques.
This paper focuses on privacy-preserving management of
provenance-aware workflow systems. We consider the formalization of privacy concerns, as well as query processing in
this context. Specifically, we address issues associated with
keyword-based search as well as with querying such repositories for structural patterns.
To give some background on provenance-aware workflow
systems, we first describe the common model for workflow
specifications and their executions (Sec. 2). We then enumerate privacy concerns (Sec. 3), consider their effect on
query processing, and discuss the challenges (Sec. 4).

A new paradigm for creating and correcting scientific analyses is emerging, that of provenance-aware workflow systems. In such systems, repositories of workflow specifications and of provenance graphs that represent their executions will be made available as part of scientific information
sharing. This will allow users to search and query both
workflow specifications and their provenance graphs: Scientists who wish to perform new analyses may search workflow repositories to find specifications of interest to reuse or
modify. They may also search provenance information to
understand the meaning of a workflow, or to debug a specification. Finding erroneous or suspect data, a user may then
ask provenance queries to determine what downstream data
might have been affected, or to understand how the process failed that led to creating the data. With the increased
amount of available provenance information, there is a need
to efficiently search and query scientific workflows and their
executions.
However, workflow authors or owners may wish to keep
some information in the repository confidential. For example, intermediate data within an execution may contain
sensitive information, such as a social security number, a
medical record, or financial information about an individual. Although users with the appropriate access level may
be allowed to see such confidential data, making it available to all users, even for scientific purposes, is an unacceptable breach of privacy. Beyond data privacy, a module
itself may be proprietary, and hiding its description may
not be enough: users without the appropriate access level
should not be able to infer its behavior if they are allowed
to see the inputs and outputs of the module. Finally, details of how certain modules in the workflow are connected
may be proprietary, and so showing how data is passed between modules may reveal too much of the structure of the
workflow. There is thus an inherent tradeoff between
the utility of the information provided in response
to a search/query and the privacy guarantees that

2. MODEL
Workflow specifications are typically represented by graphs,
with nodes denoting modules and edges indicating dataflow
between modules. Workflow specifications may be hierarchical, in the sense that a module may be composite and itself
This article is published under a Creative Commons Attribution License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/), which permits distribution
and reproduction in any medium as well allowing derivative works, provided that you attribute the original work to the author(s) and CIDR 2011.
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While the context for this statement was the use of full
body scanning in airports (where the privacy issues are obvious), it is equally valid in provenance systems!
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Figure 1: Disease Susceptibility Workflow Specification

Figure 4: Disease Susceptibility Workflow Execution
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contain a workflow. Composite modules are frequently used
to simplify workflow design and allow component reuse.
For example, the workflow in Fig. 1 estimates disease susceptibility based on genome-wide SNP array data. The input to the workflow, whose top-most level is given by the
dotted box labeled W 1, is a set of SNPs, ethnicity information, lifestyle, family history, and physical symptoms. The
first module in W 1, M1 , determines a set of disorders the
patient is genetically susceptible to based on the input SNPs
and ethnicity information. The second module, M2 , refines
the set of disorders for which the patient is at risk, based on
lifestyle, family history, and physical symptoms.
Fig. 1 also contains τ -labeled edges that give the definitions of composite modules, which we call expansions. For
example, M1 is defined by the workflow W 2, M2 by the
workflow W 3, and M 4 by the workflow W 4. Hence W 2 and
W 4 are subworkflows of W 1, and W 3 is a subworkflow of
W 2. The τ expansions (subworkflow relationships) naturally yield an expansion hierarchy as shown in Fig. 3.
Prefixes of the expansion hierarchy can be used to define
views of a workflow specification.2 Given a prefix, the view
that it defines is given by expanding the root workflow so
that composite modules in the prefix are replaced by their
expansions. For example, consider the expansion hierarchy
in Fig. 3 and its prefix consisting of {W 1, W 2}. This prefix
determines a view of the specification in Fig. 1, which is the
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Figure 5: Result of Query “Database, Disorder Risks”

simple workflow obtained from W 1 by replacing M 1 with
W 2. Another view is the full expansion, which yields a
workflow with module names I, O, M 3,and M 5 − M 15 and
whose edges include one from M 3 to M 5 and another from
M 8 to M 9. We will shortly discuss the benefit of views.
A workflow specification describes the possible run-time
executions. Executions are modeled similarly to simple workflow graphs, but additionally associate a unique process id
with a module execution, and data with edges. When execution reaches a composite module, it continues in the corresponding subworkflow and eventually returns (like a procedure call). For example, an execution of the workflow
specification in Fig. 1 is shown in Fig. 4. In this example,
for clarity we show the process id appended to the name of
the module being executed, e.g. S1:M1. Following common
practice [1], each composite module execution is represented
by two nodes, the first standing for its activation and the
second for its completion, e.g. S1:M1-begin and S1:M1-end.
In an execution, data flows over the edges. We assume
that each data item is the output of exactly one module
execution and has a unique id. We can therefore annotate
each edge M → N in the execution with the set of data

2

Recall that a prefix of a rooted tree T is a tree obtained
from T by deleting some of its subtrees (i.e., some nodes and
all their descendants).
2
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items that flow as the output of M to the input of N . For
example, in Fig. 4 the set {d0, d1} flows from I to S1:M1.
The provenance of a data item d in an execution E is
therefore the subgraph induced by the set of paths from
the start node to the end node of E that produced d as
output. In the sequel, we blur the distinction between the
provenance of data items and the executions that produce
them.
As introduced in [2], we can use views to simplify what
is seen of an execution. Using the view defined by prefix
{W 1}, the execution of Fig. 4 would be simplified to that
in Fig. 2. Thus views can be used to define access control
to address privacy concerns. Specifically, we can define a
user’s access privilege as the finest grained view that s/he
can access, called an access view.

3.

subset of intermediate data, thereby limiting the amount of
provenance data shown to the user and guaranteeing some
desired level of privacy. Ignoring for now structural privacy, one may assume that users can see the connections
(edges) between modules in the workflow; only the values of
selected intermediate data are hidden, in all executions of
the workflow. Since there may be several different subsets
of intermediate data whose hiding yields the desired level of
privacy, and certain data may have higher utility to users
than other data (i.e., data may be weighted), this becomes
an interesting optimization problem.
Structural Privacy. The goal of structural privacy is
to keep private the information that some module M contributes to the generation of a data item d, output by another module M ′ . For instance, in the execution of the workflow W 3, we may wish to hide the fact that the reformatted
data from PubMed Central (module M 13) contributes to
updating the private DB, and hence to the output of module M 11. One possible approach is to delete edges and vertices so as to eliminate all paths from M to M ′ , e.g., in this
example to delete the edge M 13 → M 11. However, by doing so, we may hide additional provenance information that
does not need be hidden (e.g., the existence of a path from
M 12 to M 11). Another approach is to use clustering, where
certain modules are hidden in a composite module P so that
the reachability of any pair (u, v) in P is no longer externally visible. For example, we could cluster M 11 and M 13
into a single composite module. However, we may now infer
incorrect provenance information, e.g., that there is a path
from M 10 to M 14. This is called an unsound view in [3, 9].
Once again, one faces a challenging optimization problem:
guaranteeing an adequate level of privacy while preserving
soundness and minimizing unnecessary loss of information.

PRIVACY

Privacy concerns are tied to the workflow components:
data, modules, and the structure of a workflow. To illustrate them, consider again the sample workflow in Fig. 1.
Data privacy requires that the output of M1, i.e., the genetic disorders the patient is susceptible to, should not be
revealed with high probability, in any execution, to users
without the required access privilege. Such data masking is
a fairly standard requirement in privacy-aware database systems. Module privacy is more particular: It requires that the
functionality of a private module – that is, the mapping it
defines between inputs and outputs – is not revealed to users
without the required access privilege. Returning to our example, assuming that M1 implements a function f1 , module
privacy with respect to M1 requires that no adversarial user
should be able to guess the output f1 (SNP, ethnicity) with
high probability for any SNP and ethnicity input. From a
patient’s perspective, this is important because they do not
want someone who may happen to have access to their SNP
and ethnicity information to be able to determine what
disorders they are susceptible to. From the module owner’s
perspective, they do not want the module to be simulated
by competitors who capture all input-output relationships.
Finally, structural privacy refers to hiding structure of the
information flow in the given execution. In this example
it might mean that users without the required access privilege should not know whether or not lifestyle was used
to calculate the disorders output by M1.
Broadly speaking, the fundamental privacy question to be
addressed is: How do we provide provable guarantees
on privacy of components in a workflow while maximizing utility with respect to provenance queries?
In doing so, we must understand 1) how to measure privacy; 2) what information can be hidden; 3) how to measure
utility; and 4) how to efficiently find solutions that simultaneously provide provably good guarantees on privacy and
utility. It is worth highlighting an important characteristic,
namely, that all privacy guarantees are required to hold over
repeated executions of a workflow with varied inputs.
We discuss module and structural privacy in more depth
before turning to the impact of privacy on search and query
mechanisms.
Module Privacy. It is easy to see that, if information
about all intermediate data is repeatedly given for multiple
executions of a workflow on different initial inputs, then partial or complete functionality of modules may be revealed.
The approach that we take in [4] is to hide a carefully chosen

4. PRIVACY-PRESERVING QUERY EVALUATION
Query languages for workflow specifications/executions support two main types of queries: structural queries that allow
users to select sub-workflows based on structural properties (e.g., “find executions where Expand SNP Set was executed before Query OMIM and return the provenance information for the latter”) and keyword queries that retrieve
sub-workflows that match the input keywords (e.g., “find
workflows that include ‘disorder risk’ and ‘database’”, result
shown in Fig. 5). In both cases the query answer is given as
a minimal view of the flow that satisfies the query criteria
and includes the keywords (see [1, 7] for formal definitions).
Much research was recently devoted to developing efficient
query evaluation techniques in this context. Unfortunately,
none of this works addresses the privacy issues mentioned in
the previous section. We consider below the main challenges
in enabling such privacy-preserving query evaluation.
Privacy-controlled Semantics for Queries. Before
one can consider efficient query evaluation, there is a need
to formally define the semantics of queries in this context.
What is the correct answer to a given query, assuming privacy and access control settings that are guided by the hierarchical structure of workflow specifications? Notably, the
three different kinds of privacy we consider may have different impacts on what information should be available to a
given user, and therefore on the semantics of queries and on
the definition of search results. For example, consider struc3
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tural privacy, which may be achieved by clustering nodes to
form a composite module. Such an approach may introduce
extraneous paths, causing misleading provenance information [9]. A challenging question to investigate is then the
following: In the presence of unsound views, how can we define search results that maximize utility (defined to be some
function of both the number of correct node connectivity
relationships captured and the number of modules disclosed
in a result), while guaranteeing privacy?
Efficient Search with Privacy Guarantees. There is
clearly a distinction between defining the formal semantics
of relevance and computing the answers efficiently. It may be
infeasible to create variants of the workflow repository, one
for each privilege/privacy setting, due to high space overhead. Instead, the information must be hidden on-the-fly,
which usually leads to processing overhead. A challenge is
then to develop algorithms for addressing these computational problems.
First, standard, non-privacy preserving workflow management systems use various indexing structures or materialized
views to speed up query processing. With data privacy, we
must manage an index with “different user views”, as users
often have different privileges on data accesses. A promising
direction is to consider representing the specification and execution graphs using advanced data structures that classify
and group their elements based on privacy settings. Another
promising direction is to consider user groups when utilizing
cached information during query processing.
Second, to achieve privacy, one needs to generate query
results with respect to user access privileges (view). One
approach would be to first construct a full answer, oblivious
to the privacy requirement. If the result reveals sensitive
information, we may gradually “zoom-out” the view by hiding details of composite modules and sensitive data, until
privacy is achieved. However, this can be expensive as each
zoom-out may involve a disk access. Techniques must be
developed to efficiently construct user-specific answers.
Impact of Ranking on Privacy Preservation. Sometimes a user query is ambiguous and the results can have
varying degrees of relevance. Ranking is therefore an important function, especially for a keyword-based search engine. One typical metric in ranking is to consider term
frequency (TF) and inverse document frequency (IDF). A
highly ranked result is likely to have more occurrences of
an input keyword than a lowly ranked result. Thus, a user
might be able to infer the range of value occurrences in a
result even though s/he is unable to see the values due to
privacy preservation. Such inference may cause information
leakage, and affect module and value privacy. A challenge is
to design sophisticated ranking schemes that not only rank
results in the order of relevance but are also privacy-aware.

5.

Although it is the strongest notion of privacy known to date,
it is also known that no deterministic algorithm can guarantee differential privacy. This may limit the applicability of
differential privacy in our setting — provenance in scientific
workflows is used to ensure reproducibility of experiments,
and adding random noise to provenance information may
render it useless.
Keyword search has been extensively studied, e.g., for
graph-structured and tree-structured (e.g., XML) data. There
has also been work on graph query languages. Nonetheless,
prior work does not adequately address the requirements of
privacy-aware workflow management systems, for two reasons. First, workflow specifications involve both dataflow
and expansion (τ ) edges, and the difference between them
cannot be ignored [1, 7]. Second, prior work does not consider search and query processing in the face of privacy requirements.
In summary, there are significant novel research challenges
that must be addressed in developing the next generation of
privacy-enabled provenance-aware workflow systems. These
range from formalizing privacy requirements and notions of
utility, and developing algorithms for associated optimization problems, to designing efficient systems that integrate
privacy with query processing mechanisms.
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RELATED WORK AND CONCLUSIONS

Extensive work has been done on privacy in various settings, e.g., data mining, social networks, auditing queries,
and statistical databases. The problem of defining a consistent set of access controls to preserve privacy in a workflow
has also been considered, as well as the problem of ensuring
the lawful use of data according to some specified privacy
policies. However, a formal study of privacy issues specific
to workflows, with provable privacy guarantees, has not yet
been done. It will be particularly interesting to see if ideas
from differential privacy [5, 6] can be used in this setting.
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